Introduction
Latvia is a country of extreme contrasts. Twenty-two years of independence have brought periods of both high growth and deep slumps. The general trend of economic development has been positive since the early 1990s, more and more people have enjoyed enhanced wellbeing, while Latvia has become accepted as a fully-fledged member of the international society of sovereign states, including the club organizations of wealthy Western states like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). As of 1 January 2014, Latvia has become a member state of the eurozone. Latvia has also been invited to start accession talks for the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD).
On the other hand, Latvia, like other Baltic countries, but in contrast to other Central 1 and Eastern European states , has meticulously followed the path of neoliberal economic policy making since the 1990's. This neoliberalism implied the prioritization of business interests (very low taxes on capital) and small government (limited social welfare). As a consequence, this business oriented economy, in combination with political and administrative elite initially composed largely of members of the Soviet nomenclature, made possible the enrichment of a few, while leaving a considerable part of society without substantial improvement, even deterioration. Labor unions in Latvia remain weak and civic society, while being vivid and enjoying better treatment on the part of the political elite since the parliamentary elections of 2010, lacks financing for large scale activity.
Certainly, the globalized economy presents a great challenge to small nations, as states must compete not only for material resources and capital, but lately also for people. The rate of success depends on flexibility and resilience. However, as small countries have limited human capital, a high degree of social and political cohesion is of the utmost importance to them. The problem is that the high volatility of economic growth erodes this cohesion, and may make departure to more stable economies an attractive option for local people at some point in time. Indeed, one has to agree with Milan Kundera that " [f] or small nations, existence is not a self-evident certainty but always a question, a wager, a 2 risk."
The Latvian Government is full of optimism. According to the National Development Plan for 2014-2020, "[i] n 2020 Latvia will be a country that is Latvian in character and self-confident, secure and resident-friendly, green and well-tended, prosperous, effective and competitive -and a home to industrious, well-educated, creative, healthy and 3 happy people." Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, has praised Latvia and the other Baltic countries for their determination in overcoming economic hardships in a decisive manner, for restoring competitiveness and market confidence through severe comprehensive austerity measures. According to 4 Lagarde, Latvia has a bright future ahead. Yet, in the context of this debate, a few additional conceptual issues regarding Latvia's crisis experience need to be disclosed. First, it seems that small and open emerging economies continue to represent a puzzle to professionals of economics. In the case of Latvia, little of the pre-crisis prophecies turned out to be true. Thus, professionals find it difficult to figure out the true nature of Latvia's overheating during the boom. Some commentators hint that it was not a boom at all, rather a normal trend growth determined by a speedy catch-up in 14 productivity level. Another contentious issue is productivity and external competitiveness. The presumed loss of competitiveness due to an excessive rise in labor costs was one of the major precrisis concerns. The latest studies reveal, however, that these concerns were groundless, as Latvia's exports grew at that time despite large domestic 15 inflation. The famous "internal devaluation" represents yet another example of Latvia's mystery. The fiscal consolidation and liquidity squeeze in the economy were meant to push down wages and prices to the levels commensurable with productivity. Nevertheless, the prices and wages turned out to be rather "sticky", and adjustment was achieved mainly through more efficient use of labor (i.e., through labor shedding and harder work). Finally, the economic growth which returned in the second part of 2009 was a result of neither fiscal consolidation nor internal devaluation. The real cause of recovery was the release of large tranche of international liquidity assistance in 16 June 2009 which assured the market that the devaluation and sovereign default had been avoided. Eventually, it was shortage of liquidity that mattered most, and the earlier release of that assistance tranche would have saved much suffering. 14 Krugman, Latvian Adventures. 15 Francesco Di Comite, Latvian external sector. 16 This second in sequence tranche of liquidity assistance of 1 billion euro was delivered by the European Commission on 2 July 2009, despite lack of agreement with the IMF who had become pessimistic about Latvia's ability to proceed with required measures of the stabilization program. 17 In fact, independence has brought a chain of rather severe economic calamities. The economic collapse of early 1990's is still in living memory when Latvia was transforming itself from the Soviet style command economy with immense productive overcapacity (Latvia used to be a huge manufacturing site for supplies to the whole Soviet Union) to a small market-based economy. At that time GDP fell by around 49 percent. The next major disasters happened in 1995, when due to a banking crisis 53 percent of household deposits vanished, and in 1998, when due to Russia's financial crisis, Latvia saw a peak-to-trough plunge in GDP which was close to 12 percent. The crisis of 2008-2009 represents the latest episode in the drama. nomic and prudential management. The scale and depth of the recent crisis is related to a complete fall-out between the Bank of Latvia and the government over macroeconomic strategy in the prelude to the crisis. The Bank of Latvia had focused on the fixed exchange rate, but the government was not willing to sacrifice the speed of growth to the fiscal austerity required by a fixed exchange rate. Besides, the Latvian authorities had greatly encouraged the widespread euroization of the economy (up to 80 percent of mortgages were issued in euro in 2008), which ultimately limited the scope of action during the recession.
Third, Latvian society continuous to suffer from entrepreneurial obsession (call it also capital dependency syndrome). Low taxes and a liberal economic regime were introduced in early 1990's with the aim of attracting foreign investment and promoting business growth. Regrettably, these policies were not revoked when the country was swamped with foreign capital after the accession to the European Union. In 2013, Latvia still has the third smallest government in the European Union and the third lowest 18 capital and corporate taxes. Meantime, the profitability of businesses in Latvia is among the highest in the European
Union. Yet, despite this business friendliness, the cumulative per capita level of foreign direct investment in Latvia is still considerably lower than in Estonia (see Table 2 ). In a similar vein, the development of manufacturing in Latvia is also considerably lagging behind the other Baltic countries.
Fourth, and in the meantime, the Latvian state in particular and society in general has spectacularly failed to bring the interests of people like the quality of education and health care, equity, decent living conditions, etc. to the forefront of the daily political agenda. During the boom, people's loyalty to the political elite and state was bought in a blunt manner with large chunks of money. People were splashed cash from wage increases, generous social benefits, and also from easy accessible mortgages and consumption loans. When crisis hit, without these benefits people's allegiance proved to be rather thin: first -part of the political elite was kicked out in elections, second -many simply packed their things and emigrated. The lesson is, as it was put by Milton Friedman, that "you can't fool all of the people all of the time." Many felt and still feel cheated and insecure. Each consecutive crisis has added to this feeling of insecurity, alienating people from the state. National economic situation will improve in the year to The good news is that the fiscal consolidation was well targeted to make Latvia compliant with the Maastricht criteria right on time. Austerity also enabled cuts in a number of less efficient programs, and fostered valuable reforms in the health and education sectors. On the other hand -the scale of consolidation was enormous for peacetime: the amount of overall fiscal consolidation stretched over from 2009 to 2011 is estimated at 15 percent of Latvia's GDP (note that the size of the government is only 36.5 percent of GDP). The measures were cruel: the number of public officials was reduced by 1/3 and the remuneration bill of public officials was cut by 25 percent. Such measures had serious repercussions on the quality of public services and the social situation. With hindsight, it also seems that this fiscal consolidation has failed on two counts. First, the Latvian public sector was not as bloated as it was often depicted (the government is small, and the number of public sector employees had increased only by 11 percent between 2004 and 2008, which cannot be counted as a serious deflection of human resources from the private sector). Second -the expected wage cut spillover to private sector did not happen. The scale of the consolidation had significance only to the international lenders but not to the market because of the small size of the government.
Another major problem related to fiscal consolidation was the regressive nature of many measures taken. The increase in value added and excise taxes, the decrease in the threshold for personal income tax allowance, and pension cuts (these were later recalled due to ruling of the Constitutional court) without proper compensation were among the enacted measures. At the same time, the government refused to follow the advice of the international lenders to consider taxes on real estate and capital gains. As a result, the IMF had to admit that the burden of Latvian budgetary consolidation fell disproportionately on the 20 poor.
Despite sound economic gains, the Latvian economy has not still recovered to the level of pre-crisis development, and still exhibits some signs of its depressed state: 1) Although Latvia's nominal GDP has already surpassed the pre-crisis level, the real GDP is still lagging behind its peak by around 10 percent and it could take further 3 to 4 years to cover this gap; 2) Unemployment remains stubbornly high, though it is gradually diminishing and reached 11.5 percent in June 2013. Long-term unemployment is of particular concern -7.8 percent of economically active people (in Estonia -5.5; Lithuania -6.5 percent). innovation driven economy. This indicates that for Latvia there is still a room for growth through better efficiency performance (most notably institutional, e.g., courts, competition authorities, public administration, and of labor force). However, improvements in these areas will not ensure income levels commensurable with the advanced European countries. Without targeted policies towards business sophistication and creation of new products and technologies Latvia will remain caught in the middle-income trap. The GCI also reveals that during the crisis Latvia has lost a good degree of advantage in financial sector sophistication. The soundness of banks, easiness of access to loans and access to financing through local equity markets are still below pre-crisis levels. On the other hand, Latvia has advanced considerably in the area of technological readiness, which was made possible mainly due to the wide use of internet and the availability of up-to-date mobile and internet technologies.
According the GCI, the size of the domestic market and accessibility of qualified labor significantly reduces Latvia's global competitiveness. Emigration represents the biggest problem. Although emigration long predates the crisis, the severity of the slump substantially contributed to the outflow of people. Actually, the successive waves of emigration have created a powerful social network of migrants fostering further emigration, e.g., of friends and 23 relatives. Ironically, people have become Latvia's major export product.
A circular migration of people is not a bad thing. It increases labor efficiency, contributes to the cross-border flow of know-how and skills, and ensures higher personal incomes. In Latvia's case, emigration allowed many people to avoid the misery of joblessness and personal default. Each year many hundreds of millions of euro are transferred to Latvia as labor remittances which are used to support family members and repay debts to the banks. It is estimated that if people had stayed, the level of unemployment would have been from 3 to 6 percent higher (the actual level was close to 22 24 percent). Nevertheless, as young people are those who emigrate, and they are not replaced through incoming immigration, Latvia's population is aging more quickly than suggested by statistics on demography. Moreover, as better educated people dominate among the emigrants, the problem of brain-drain becomes acute. What's more, when young people leave, they cause a huge loss to the society in terms of lost revenues. If no mechanisms are put in place to recover these losses, "the largely permanent departure of the younger and more educated workers may indeed be costly 25 for those who stay."
12 22 The GCI assumes that economies in the first stage are mainly factor-driven and compete based on their factor endowments-primarily low-skilled labour and natural resources. Countries will then move into the efficiency-driven stage of development, when they must begin to develop more efficient production processes and increase product quality. At this point, competitiveness is increasingly driven by higher education and training, efficient goods markets, well-functioning labour markets, developed financial markets, the ability to harness the benefits of existing technologies, and a large domestic or foreign market. Finally, as countries move into the innovation-driven stage, companies must compete by producing new and different goods through new technologies and/or the most sophisticated production processes or business models. For more details, see Global Competitiveness Report 2012 -2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012 Figures 1 and 2) . During the crisis, income inequality subsided to some extent, even though poverty deepened, thus reinforcing social cleavages in Latvia.
After the recession, labor market difficulties have become more wide-29 spread and probably more varied: -The share of working age population has fallen sharply since before the crisis, long-term unemployment remains elevated, and labor market participation is shrinking. This problem is particularly acute in Latvia's regions, where, despite a general depopulation trend, unemployment is still on rise (see Figure 1) wages. This fact points to weak labor unions and low employment protection in Latvia.
If income inequality had a tendency to diminish during the crisis, poverty, on the contrary, deepened, and society's polarization increased. According to a
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World Bank study , social disparity in Latvia is among the highest in the European Union. Moreover, the situation in Latvia seems to be significantly worse than in Estonia and Lithuania, especially with respect to severe material deprivation. Thus, Latvia is a country with the highest share of population: first, at-riskof-poverty (21.3 percent on average; however, in regions outside the capital this figure fluctuates between 30 -40 percent); second, in severe material deprivation (27.4 percent); and, third, living in extreme poverty (1 percent with income of 2 euro per day and 3 percent with income of 4 euro per day).
The main losers from the crisis, according to the same World Bank study, are children, young adults, single parents, tenants paying a market rate, and those living in urban areas. Many of those who lost jobs during the crisis were well-off beforehand. Encouraged by general euphoria, many had taken mortgages or loans for consumption. During the crisis the ability to service debts sharply diminished. The rate of overdue loans 34 jumped to around 20 percent in Latvia. Although the debt misery was to a large extent self-imposed, as in the run-up to the crash saving rates among Latvian households were very low, many became victims to the illusion of wealth.
The studies of the European Commission and the World Bank indicate that Latvia does not have a particularly generous welfare system neither when compared to other countries in the European Union. Besides, Latvia was relatively unprepared to protect households at the onset of the crisis. Initially, Latvia's government's guaranteed minimum income (GMI) program was only moderately well targeted to the poor -no more than 30 percent of benefits went to the poorest quintile; the coverage was also very low and reached 5 percent of the poorest quintile. However, as recognized by the 35 European Commission , the government managed to respond quickly by introducing reforms. It eased eligibility requirements, extended the duration of unemployment insurance benefits, and introduced public works programs. Economic situation in Latvia's regions
Source: Eurostat
Latvian health statistics are also bleak. The infant mortality rate is the highest among the Baltic countries and the third highest in the European Union (behind Romania and Bulgaria). In Latvia, people have the shortest life expectancy (73.9 years) and the third lowest number of years of healthy life (53.7 years for men and 56.7 36 years for women).
Between 2004 and 2008, the health sector saw real spending growth of more than 70 percent, with additional resources focused on hospitals, ambulatory services and patient pharmaceuticals, to the 37 detriment of outpatient care. In education, the spending increase of 39 percent was used to boost the number of teaching and non-teaching staff despite falling enrolment numbers. Naturally, during the budgetary consolidation of 2009 and 2010 much of this extra spending had to be scaled back: a great number of rural schools had to be closed, teachers discharged, and much of the newly built hospital capacity had to lie idle or even be shut down. Fair enough, many of the reforms implemented in educational and health sectors under the pressure of fiscal consolidation were rather valuable, like the optimization of the number of teachers in schools, greater focus on early illness diagnostics and outpatient care in medicine. However, the current risks involve continuous human suffering from a drop in incomes, unemployment and also the intellectual degradation of villages in the countryside linked to the closure of public establishments.
Under severe economic pressure, one would expect a rise in crime level and violence, as some people lose their dignity due to economic hardship. Fortunately, this was not the case for Latvia. The general crime level has stayed rather low (around 80 percent of the 38 European average). The overall number of registered crimes even dropped between 2008 and 2010 by 8 percent. This seemingly positive development has two rather odd background facts that should be considered. First, policeman, prosecutors and judges were among those public officials who saw their salaries being cut in 2009 and 2010. Second, the number of prison inmates in Latvia is among the highest in the European Union -326.8 per hundred thousand inhabitants which is twice the average of the European Union.
The political impact of the crisis
Massive gaps in income between rich and poor can be harmful to social cohesion and the successful functioning of any society, especially when inequality is perceived as unfair. This argument seems even more pertinent in relation to transition countries like Latvia. Namely, in these countries, although initially perceived as a positive signal of increased opportunities, income inequality started to undermine people's life satisfaction when individuals became skeptical about the legitimacy of the enrichment of those 39 who won out in the reform process.
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The Life in Transition Surveys of EBRD show that, in Latvia, trust in other people and institutions has substantially fallen during the crisis with only 27 percent of people showing trust in others in 2010 (from 37 percent in 2006). What's more, the economic crisis has also considerably increased Latvian people's aversion to democracy and market institutions, as mere 15 percent prefer a combination of democracy and a market economy over other forms of governance (down from 31 percent in 2006). Such attitudes do not testify to an obtained resilience or immunity to hardships; rather, they suggest a serious legitimacy crisis of the Latvian state and political elite.
-Impact on collective citizens' identity Nietzsche's famous expression -"What doesn't kill us makes us stronger," alongside the locally originated saying -"Weeds don't perish so easily," are widely used in Latvia to cheer one up when depressed. During history, Latvian people have had to endure repeated severe hardships and examinations of resilience. In the past, most of the hardships were imposed by foreign rulers, with the latest episodes happening during the Soviet occupation time. The traumatic historical experience (destruction of the state before World War II, violence and repressions during and after the war, life under totalitarianism) and continuous geopolitical tensions with Russia make Latvian people feel rather skeptical about the fortunes of independent Latvian state as a collective endeavor of the Latvian community. Such an attitude can be explained by the very short experience of political self-rule. The first democratic Latvian Republic lasted only from 1918 to 1934 (from 1934 to 1940, until the Soviet invasion, the country was ruled by autocrat Karlis Ulmanis). The current republic is the second attempt at democratic self-rule. Certainly, democracy cannot be built in a few years time. The propagation of democratic instincts is a painstaking endeavor, happening through trial and error. In this sense, Latvian civic society is maturing. And there has been a lot of progress since the 1990s.
However, recent recurrent episodes of financial and economic disorder resonate with inherited incredulity from past misfortunes, thus building a strong feeling of distrust in the Latvian political system. A striving for self-enrichment, tax evasion, corruption and lately also emigration are manifestations of this distrust. The ideals of the Singing Revolution of the late 1980s have long been eaten away by mundane malfeasances and an endless struggle for survival. The general perception of the Latvian people is that society in general and the state in particular has failed to deliver the promised security and welfare.
A study conducted by the Cross-Sectoral Coordination Center of the Latvian Government recognizes the severity of the problem and points to fact that "economic and fiscal problems have resulted in a considerable deterioration of the people's capacity to act", therefore "individual solutions (emigration, the grey economy) prevail over collective solutions (payment of taxes, participation, social entrepreneurship), deepening the 42 crisis in the society." In the terminology 43 of Alfred Hirschman , people have abandoned their "loyalty" to the Latvian state, and, instead of raising "voice", have chosen to "exit". Among the European Union's member states, only Lithuania has seen a more intense exodus of people.
It is very popular to attribute the latest wave of emigration to Latvia's economic conditions. Some argue that the economies of Latvia and Lithuania are too small to provide all the economically active with well paid jobs, therefore, it is natural, like in other episodes of th th emigration, particularly in the 19 and 20 century, to shed the spare labor to countries with labor shortages. However, there are two major problems with this line of argument. First, the intensity of emigration from Latvia, and also Lithuania, points to the political nature of the people's departure. It is a form of latent protest against economic, social and political deficiencies. Second, Latvia is a small country with very limited human resources. The departure of too many people, as recognized by the experts of the IMF, may make governance of the 44 country too costly for those who stay.
In fact, a comparison between results of public opinion surveys of the three Baltic countries (see Table 2 ) reveals rather huge distance between Estonia on the one hand and Latvia and Lithuania on the other hand. Estonian people have more positive thoughts on almost every account, and, unsurprisingly, Estonia is the only Baltic country whose scale of emigration can still be measured with a single digit number. This implies a strong correlation between the people's trust in national political institutions and their propensity to emigrate.
-Impact on voter's attitude to political institutions and political preferences The level of distrust in Latvian political institutions has historically been high, as suggested by the public opinion surveys. A crisis of such a magnitude as that which Latvia has recently experienced could not pass by without significant alterations in people's attitudes. Thus, according to Eurobarometer survey's, in Latvia, the level of people's trust in government went down from 32 percent in 2006 to 9 percent in 2009, and then up to 20 percent in 2013. As for political parties and the elite of the country, the attitude towards them is much worse. In 2006 only 9 percent trusted them, the same as in 2013. Meantime, at the peak of the crisis the trust in parties reached an extremely low level -only 2 percent.
A particular feature of the Latvian political system, which is based on parliamentarianism, is that the traditional political cleavages of right and left are not really functioning. Instead, the political scene is dominated by ethnic issues because a large part (around 32 percent) of Latvian citizens has Russian or other non-Latvian ethnic origin. This group of Latvian citizens, often referred to as Russianspeakers, has high and consistent loyalty towards political parties claiming the representation of their ethnic interests (education in mother tongue, liberalization of Latvia's citizenship regime, the Russian language status in Latvia. etc.). The most popular political force at the moment is the "Harmony Center" alliance which has center-left orientation. Latvian voters in general don't trust parties with a significant Russian presence, as these parties, like "Harmony Center", are suspected of receiving funding and instructions from Moscow. Therefore the Latvians are inclined to vote for Latvian parties who happened to represent the political spectrum from radical right to moderate right. No popular Latvian party claims to be leftist, though some of them like the nationalistic "For Freedom and Fatherland" pretend to have a socialist orientation in economic affairs.
The ultimate result of this clear-cut ethnic split among voters is that the normal functioning of opposition along the lines of distribution of national wealth has been inhibited. This to a large extent explains the entrenched business orientation of Latvian politics.
Despite this fact, since the 2006 parliamentary elections the Latvian political landscape has seen considerable changes. First, a large part of major political forces of that time has lost their appeal to the voters due to the crisis and has no representation in parliament. These are the so-called oligarch or probusiness parties. As of 2010 the political scenery is dominated by center right and right wing parties who claim to defend justice and anti-corruption activities. Since the state president dismissed the parliament and extraordinary elections were called in 2011, the dominating forces have been "Unity" and the "Reform party". Both parties have rather identical political programs: both have reform orientations and have invested a lot of effort in restructuring the Latvian economy after the crisis. However, despite the return of economic growth, these two parties are losing public support. The "Reform party" is doing particularly badly.
The next parliamentary elections will take place in autumn 2014 and it seems that center parties are going to be the main losers from these forthcoming elections with nationalistic and leftist pro-Russian parties being the winners. One of the causes of center parties' demise is emigration. The young and liberal minded people are those who mostly emigrate. Voting abroad is allowed in Latvia's elections, however, voter's activity outside the country is rather low (although it has a tendency to increase) and will not compensate for the loss of support to center parties within the current electoral system. As a result, more radicalism and conservative populism should be expected from Latvian politics in the forthcoming years.
Conclusions
The current state of Latvia can be best described in medical terms: the patient is pale, but alive. The financial woes have been successfully resolved, but economic, social and political challenges remain. The negative results of the crisis are continuing to affect the fabric of social and political life in Latvia. The current economic recovery is superficial and will not be long-lasting as it lacks a strong social base. First, due to emigration of mostly young and educated people and demographic decline, and, second, due to the entrenched business orientation of Latvian politics which prevents the full utilization of Latvia's human potential. Without any further resolute action, another stroke -if not even terminal cardiac arrest -is not far away.
A few ideas on what could be done to alleviate Latvia's problems: -The government should focus on the remaining structural inefficiencies in vocational and higher education, in infrastructure, court system, and competition, promote more active labor market policies, investment in science and research, etc.; -The neoliberal ideological orientation should finally be left to history and politics reoriented towards social democratic tradition. Latvia, as a small nation needs something like German corporatism, and not Anglo-Saxon liberalism; -The size of the government should be enlarged through broader taxation, including taxes on capital and land. The taxation and the social safety net needs further restructuring in order to make people in Latvia more equal in terms of income; -The government should devise instruments, including changes in electoral system, facilitating cooperation with Latvian people living abroad. Latvia needs to adjust to situation of high cross-borders mobility of people; -The support from the European Union will be of critical importance, as the Latvian government will not be able to raise enough resources to maintain public services at decent quality due to people's emigration. _______
